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Abstract
We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all
essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the
sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created.
The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie
for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds
it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller players have
preferences over who they take their share from. When the domi-
nant player makes the first offer in an alternating offer framework,
we analyse whether it should conduct negotiations sequentially with
some grouping of players, or simultaneously. We demonstrate that
the dominant player will prefer simultaneous negotiation. The other
players would prefer to negotiate early with the dominant one, and
then to see remaining rivals negotiate simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
When your expected payoff depends on what your partners grant you, should
you bargain with them in sequence or simultaneously? Many economic agents
face this kind of question, and the answer depends on the underlying structure
of the bargaining framework. Based on the Rubinstein (1982) alternating
offers model, the theoretical literature considers various configurations of
bargaining depending on the number of players and the number of different
surpluses (cakes) that are to be divided. This paper is a contribution to the
strand of the literature in which n players divide a single surplus.
A typical illustration of the choice of sequential versus simultaneous pro-
cedures in Rubinstein bargaining can be found in Barneji (2002). One union
is assumed to bargain over a wage/employment contract with two Cournot
duopolists, where one contract is specified for each firm. The simultaneous
procedure means that the union bargains with the two firms at the same
time while the sequential protocol means that the union bargains first with
one firm and then, on agreement being reached, with the other firm. The
author assumes that, during a round of bargaining, no production takes place
within the negotiating firm whereas the other firm produces according to the
terms of the preexisting contract (in the first round) or the newly signed con-
tract (in the second round). The union will get a higher discounted payoff
in the sequential procedure when the wage bill of the preexisting contract
of the firm involved in the second round of bargaining exceeds its wage bill
defined in the simultaneous procedure. Moreover, the union prefers to bar-
gain first (second) with the firm that has the smallest (largest) difference
between the preexisting contract and the simultaneous contract. In a right-
to-manage model and using the Nash solution, Barneji (2002) shows that the
union prefers sequencing to simultaneity when the higher wage it gets from
one firm increases the payoffs of its Cournot rival and thus enhances this
firm’s willingness to contract on a higher wage in the second round. How-
ever the optimal order in sequencing cannot be determined. Extending Horn
and Wolinsky’s (1988) model1, Marshall and Merlo (2004) show that a union
prefers to bargain in sequence rather than simultaneously whatever the order
of negotiation. Furthermore, the firm that bargains first with the union in
the sequential case would prefer to be second whatever the procedure since
1Horn and Wolinsky (1988) study the conditions under which an upstream supplier
prefers to bargain in sequence or simultaneously with two downstream cournot dupolists.
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the simultaneous and the sequential bargaining yield the same payoff. Since
firms are identical, the game is symmetric. The authors also show that a
union always prefers "pattern bargaining" to the other procedures, although
the opposite is true for firms. Pattern bargaining is defined as a sequential
negotiation where the agreement with the first firm determines the take-it-
or-leave-it offer that the union makes to all remaining firms.
The bargaining literature on multi-issues deals with two players who are
bargaining over n cakes. The analysis of the order in which the issues are
negotiated has been conducted in complete and incomplete information set-
tings. With complete information, the inaugural literature assumed an exoge-
nous agenda. Fershtman (1990) determines the conditions under which play-
ers prefer to bargain in sequence or simultaneously over two issues. However,
the difference between the two procedures disappears as players’ discount
rates become identical. Bush and Horstmann (1997) show that the impact of
the agenda persists when agreements can be sequentially implemented and
not only once all issues have been resigned as in Fershtman (1990). The
result depends on the relative valuation on the two issues. A player prefers
a sequential procedure in which its highly valued issue is negotiated over
first while it prefers a simultaneous procedure when its highly valued issue is
bargained over last. Focusing only on sequential procedures, Flamini (2004)
shows that the relative valuation of the two cakes between players matters
but also the urgency/difficulty of an issue in the sense that a failure of the
negotiation on that issue may lead to a breakdown in the negotiation for the
second one.
A second generation of papers considers an endogenous agenda where
players are free to make an offer about any subset of issues (Inderst, 2000;
In and Serrano, 2004). Inderst (2000) considers bilateral bargaining over a
set of issues in which players can bargain sequentially over a partition of the
set of issues into subsets or simultaneously over all issues. When issues are
mutually beneficial for the two players, the bargain ends with simultaneous
agreement. The agreement is immediate and exploits the trade-offs in the
marginal rates of substitutions between the issues. However, when there is
at least one controversial issue, yielding a positive payoff for one player but
a negative for the other, multiple equilibria can arise. In and Serrano (2004)
show that when players are forced to negotiate one issue at a time, their
inability to exploit trade-offs among issues yields a multiplicity of equilibrium
agreements. With incomplete information, several papers have shown that
sequential negotiation can be used to signal bargaining power, making the
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agenda endogenous (Bac and Raff, 1996; Bush and Horstmann, 1999, 2002).
In Bush and Horstmann (2002), the value of the surplus of one issue called
the "easy" issue is known to both players while the value of the surplus of the
so-called "hard" issue is private information for one player. Results show that
the easy issue is bargained over first when agreements are implemented once
they are signed. When the implementation of agreements is simultaneous,
the hard issue is bargained over first. However both players prefer sequential
implementation.
Multilateral bargaining models deal with the division of one cake among
n players. It is well-known that this division raises some theoretical problems
since the Rubinstein result on the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome cannot be extended to three or more players when unanimity is
required. To avoid the multiplicity of equilibria, Krishna and Serrano (1996)
introduce an exit rule asserting that after a proposal has been made to all the
players, any player can accept the offered share, leave the negotiation table
with the awarded share and let the remaining players continue to bargain
over the rest of the cake. A new division of the surplus is then offered until
agreement is reached. In that way bargaining occurs in sequence and the
uniqueness of the outcome is restored. Suh and Wen (2006) also emphasize
sequential negotiation through bilateral bargaining rounds, in which their
aim is to find protocols giving the Nash solution. However the question of
how to share one cake among several players in the presence of a dominant
player who ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created has re-
ceived little attention.2 Cai (2000, 2003) considers a bargaining framework
in which the dominant player bargains in a bilateral manner with all the
other passive players according the following rule. In each round, the domi-
nant player bargains with one passive player; if an agreement is reached, the
passive player leaves the game with a binding share while in case of disagree-
ment, he/she is moved to the end of the queue. Then the bargaining process
moves to the next round with a new passive player until the emergence of a
global agreement with all the passive players ensuring that the project will be
implemented. In common with this approach, we have a bargaining frame-
work with a dominant player who is dependent on agreeing with all other
players before a surplus can be created and shared. We allow the dominant
player to divide the opponents into groups that he then bargains sequentially
2Clark & Pereau (2007) consider dominant player bargaining between three agents
where the focus is on sequential bargaining.
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with, but all within-group bargaining occurs simultaneously. At one extreme
we have completely sequential bargaining with one player at a time, and at
the other a simultaneous framework where all deals are bargained over si-
multaneously. We characterize the equilibrium shares that will result from
each potential constellation of opponents, and show that the dominant player
secures the highest share from the completely simultaneous framework. Fur-
ther, we show that each of the dominant firm’s opponents would prefer to be
in a group that negotiates early in any sequential process, and that the most
preferred position of such a player is to negotiate with the dominant player
alone in the first round, and then to see the dominant player negotiate with
all remaining players simultaneously in round two.
Section two presents the basic model, and section three presents the pos-
sible negotiation processes and solves for the equilibrium shares and expected
payoffs that result from each of these. Brief conclusions are offered in section
4.
2 The model
The model that we use here is an extension of the framework in Clark and
Pereau (2007). There are n+ 1 players, all of which are essential in creating
a surplus. We consider a two stage model in which negotiations take place
at stage 1 over the division of the surplus if it is created at stage 2. Stage
2 analyses the creation of the surplus. Inputs from all of the players are
essential in creating the surplus, but suppose player 0 takes on the job of
coordinating its creation. Then at stage 1, player 0 seeks to obtain binding
agreements on surplus division with the n other, identical players; based
on these contingent agreements, player 0 must then decide whether it is
profitable to create the surplus and share it accordingly. Fix the size of the
surplus at B > 0. At the start of stage 2, the cost of creating the surplus
is made known as the result of a draw from a uniform distribution on [0, T ]
where T is a known positive parameter. Let x be the realized cost. Player
0 then creates the surplus as long as the share of the surplus it receives at
least covers the cost of its creation.3
3The model of surplus creation used here depicts Coase’s (1960) famous example of the
negotiations between a railroad company and a group of farmers. In order to create the
surplus, the railroad is dependent on securing an agreement with each farmer; however, in
pursuing the largest possible share of the surplus, each farmer is mindful of the fact that
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At stage 1, none of the players know whether the surplus will be created or
not. Then the expected profit of players j = 1, 2, ..., n and 0 seen from stage
1 are





















Normalizing B2/T = 1, writing s0 = 1 −
Pn
i=1 si, s = (s0, s1, ..., sn) and
defining 1 ≥ δ > 0 to be the common discount factor, the expected profit of
0 and each rival obtained at time t can be rewritten as













3 The negotiation process
In the negotiation, let us assume that the players other than 0 are divided
intom groups consisting of ka players in each group so that
Pm
a=1 ka = n. No
restriction is made about the number of players in each group other than this
summing up condition. Within each group, player 0 makes offers to group
the project must be profitable enough for the railroad to want to instigate the project that
creates the surplus. Hence each farmer wants to increase his share at the expense of the
other farmers, not the railroad.
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members simultaneously. Each group is negotiated with in turn, and we can
assume without loss of generality that the order is increasing in group index;
group 1 negotiates first, then group 2, with group m entering the negotiation
last. Hence we can identify some special cases, in particular when m = 1
we have fully simultaneous negotiation, and when ka = 1, a = 1, ...,m we
have fully sequential negotiation one player at a time. Each negotiation is
assumed to be a Rubinstein alternating offers setup in which player 0 makes
the first offer to the players with which it is bargaining. After the initial
offer, the other players can accept or make a counteroffer in the next period.
The process continues into the potentially infinite future until agreement is
reached. Only when agreement is reached with all players does the game
proceed to stage 2 to determine whether the surplus will be created.
Denote by sa,j the share of player j = 1, ..., ka in group a = 1, ...,m. The
sum that group a manages to secure is then
Pka
i=1 sa,i ≡ Sa. Furthermore,
let Sa,−j = Sa − sa,j, the share of group a excluding that gained by j. The
negotiation game is solved backwards for the subgame perfect equilibrium,
starting with the negotiation between the members of group m and player 0.
When the game has reached this stage, the total share left to be negotiated
over is 1−
Pm−1
a=1 Sa, and in its bilateral negotiation with player 0 player j in
group m takes the shares of its fellow group members as fixed. Denote the
claim that player j makes for himself as s(m,j)m,j and the offer made by player
0 to this player as s(0)m,j. When player 0 negotiates with such a player j in

































Here (2) reflects the offer made by j such that player 0 is indifferent be-
tween accepting this and making a counteroffer, and (3) reflects the same
indifference condition for player j.
Solving this system, given that player 0 makes the first offer yields for
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Hence, the total amount captured by group m is a proportion of the
surplus that is left after the first m − 1 group negotiations, with the factor
of proportionality increasing in both the discount factor and the number of


























, j = 1, ..., km
where the proportion of the surplus gained by each member naturally de-






Now the negotiation with group m− 1 can be analyzed, given the results
for the final bargaining round. The negotiating players take into account
how their agreements affect the share that m gets in the next round through






















































sm−1,j , j = 1, ..., km−1 (7)
Setting up the Rubinstein conditions for this negotiation with the mem-































This programme is qualitatively identical to (2) and (3), and hence the
shares and sum of shares of group m− 1 follow the same pattern as (4):
Sm−1 =
αkm−1





















Solving recursively gives the profit of the first group to negotiate as:
S1 =
αk1




1 + α(k1 − 1)
S2 =
αk2
1 + α(k2 − 1)
(1− S1) =
αk2(1− α)
(1 + α(k1 − 1)) (1 + α(k2 − 1))
These calculations lead to the solution of the negotiation process that is
summed up in the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 Suppose that player 0 negotiates with each group in ascend-
ing order, and that the negotiation within each group is simultaneous with 0







.Then the sum of
shares, and individual shares gained by group z = 1, 2, ...,m is
Sz =
αkz(1− α)z−1







Πza=1 (1 + α(ka − 1))
, j = 1, 2, ..., kz (12)











Member j of group z has an expected profit of
πz,j = s0sz,j =
α(1− α)m+z−1
(Πma=1(1 + α(ka − 1))) (Πza=1 (1 + α(ka − 1)))
(15)
The results in Proposition 1 show how the shares and expected payoffs
are affected by the number of groups and the distribution of the members be-
tween groups. These expressions can then be analyzed for their comparative
static effects. Consider first the share (and the expected profit) obtained by
player 0. Suppose the number of groups is kept fixed atm. Then the effect of
the distribution of players among the groups affects only the denominator in
(13), and this denominator expression is minimized by placing one player in
all but one of the m groups, with the remaining n−(m−1) in the last group.
Which group it is that gets the most members is irrelevant for the expected
share (profit) of player 0. This is the distribution of players among m groups
that maximizes the share of player 0; denote this by bs0(m) = (1−α)m(1+α(n−m)) .
Given this distribution, suppose that one of the groups consisting of a single
player is taken away by placing this player in the largest group. The change
in expected share for player 0 is then
bs0(m− 1)− bs0(m) = (1− α)m−1
(1 + α(n− (m− 1))) −
(1− α)m
(1 + α(n−m)) (16)
=
α2 (1− α)m−1 (n+ 1−m)
(1 + α(n− (m− 1))) (1 + α(n−m)) > 0
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where the sign follows directly from the fact that n ≥ m. This leads directly
to the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that player 0 can freely choose the number of groups
and their composition before the negotiation process commences. Then player
0 will choose m = 1 and k1 = n, leading to maximal share s0 =
(1−α)
(1+α(n−1)) .
Hence, the dominant player secures the largest share for itself (and thus
the largest payoff) by having a purely simultaneous negotiation process in
which all deals are negotiated at the same time. Even though the effect of
future bargains is neutralized in the sequential negotiation process (see (8)),
the each sequential deal is made over the size of the surplus that remains
after all previous steps in the sequence have been agreed. In the simultaneous
negotiation, this effect is not present since all players take actions that assume
the unknown shares of the opponents as fixed.
The maximal share that 0 can obtain is increasing in the discount factor,
reaching its maximum in the limit case δ → 1 at 3
n+3
.
To get the largest private share possible (and largest private expected
payoff), each of the n other players would prefer to be in a group that ne-
gotiates early in any sequential process, as is easily verified by comparing
successive values of sz,j from (12). Which group gets the largest total share
cannot be determined unambiguously, however.
Proposition 3 With m groups, player j = 1, .., n would prefer to be a mem-
ber of the first group to enter negotiations.
Suppose now that there are m groups and that one of the players (in
group z) other than 0 can decide the distribution of players among these.
Maximizing the profit of this player requires making the denominator in
(15) as small as possible. We have already seen that the first part of this
expression is minimized by putting one player in each group and then the
remaining n − (m − 1) in the last group. Whereas player 0 did not have a
preference for which of the groups is largest, we see from the second term in
the denominator of (15) is minimized by putting one player in each group
up to and including z and then putting the remaining players in following
groups. Hence, player j in z would like the same distribution of the mass
of players as 0 but wants to negotiate before the large group. Proposition 3
demonstrates that player j would want to be in the first group (z = 1). Thus,
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with a fixed number of groups, the maximal payoff achieved by j in group 1
is bπ1,j(m) = α1−α (1−α)m(1+α(n−m)) = α1−αbs0(m). Since this expression is proportional
to the maximal share that 0 can achieve with a fixed number of groups, so is
the calculation in (16). Then player j prefers a smaller number of negotiating
groups. Then there are two candidate structures for maximizing the payoff
of one of the players: either to negotiate first alone, and to have a single
large group with all other players negotiate simultaneously in second place,
or completely simultaneous negotiation. Call the expected payoffs to j from
these structures π1,j(m = 2) and π1,j(m = 1). Then using (15) we get
π1,j(m = 2)−π1,j(m = 1) =
α2(1− α)(n− 1)(1− α2(n− 1) + α(n− 3))
(α(n− 2) + 1)(α(n− 1) + 1)2 > 0
The sign of this expression is readily determined since the only ambiguous
term is (1− α2(n− 1) + α(n− 3)). Given the definition of α, we have that
1
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≥ α ≥ 0, so that this expression is increasing in n, and is positive at n = 1.
Hence we have determined the following result:
Proposition 4 Player j = 1, ..., n prefers a negotiation structure in which
it negotiates alone with player 0 in the first round, followed by simultaneous
negotiation between 0 and all of the remaining players in round two.
This result reflects the fact that simultaneous negotiation secures a high
share for player 0, making it more likely that the surplus will be created, and
that there is a first-mover advantage for any player that can make the first
bargain with 0 since the others are bargaining over the remaining surplus.
4 Summary and conclusion
This paper considers the effect that the order of negotiation can have on
the creation of the surplus that is bargained over. In situations where a
dominant player can create a surplus if it is sufficiently profitable, different
groupings of negotiation partners will affect the share that each group can
achieve; the order of the groups’ negotiation also plays a prominent role here.
When faced with n rivals, we have examined the equilibrium of an alternat-
ing offers bargaining model, and the shares that arise for any constellation of
grouping of the rival partners. Suppose that the dominant player is the rail-
road company in the Coase example; then this firm will negotiate with each
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farmer individually. On the other hand, one can imagine that the dominant
player is a firm which is attempting to produce a new product that combines
fragmented intellectual property. Then it may need to negotiate with some
groups of firms that own the rights to different patent groups.
We solve for the unique equilibrium for an arbitrary constellation of play-
ers, and then conduct comparative static analysis to uncover which negotia-
tion structure each would prefer. The dominant player prefers to negotiate
with all partners simultaneously, but each of the partners would prefer to
secure its share first in negotiations with the dominant player and then see
all rival partners participate in a simultaneous bargain over the remaining
cake.
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